# Authors:
# Trevor Perrin
# Google (adapted by Sam Rushing) - NPN support
# Google - minimal padding
# Martin von Loewis - python 3 port
# Yngve Pettersen (ported by Paul Sokolovsky) - TLS 1.2
# Hubert Kario
#
# See the LICENSE file for legal information regarding use of this file.
"""Helper class for TLSConnection."""
from __future__ import generators
import io
import time
import socket
from .utils.compat import *
from .utils.cryptomath import *
from .utils.codec import Parser, BadCertificateError
from .utils.lists import to_str_delimiter, getFirstMatching
from .errors import *
from .messages import *
from .mathtls import *
from .constants import *
from .recordlayer import RecordLayer
from .defragmenter import Defragmenter
from .handshakehashes import HandshakeHashes
from .bufferedsocket import BufferedSocket
from .handshakesettings import HandshakeSettings
from .keyexchange import KeyExchange
[docs]
class TLSRecordLayer(object):
"""
This class handles data transmission for a TLS connection.
Its only subclass is :py:class:`~tlslite.tlsconnection.TLSConnection`.
We've
separated the code in this class from TLSConnection to make things
more readable.
:vartype sock: socket.socket
:ivar sock: The underlying socket object.
:vartype session: ~tlslite.Session.Session
:ivar session: The session corresponding to this connection.
Due to TLS session resumption, multiple connections can correspond
to the same underlying session.
:vartype ~.version: tuple
:ivar ~.version: The TLS version being used for this connection.
(3,0) means SSL 3.0, and (3,1) means TLS 1.0.
:vartype closed: bool
:ivar closed: If this connection is closed.
:vartype resumed: bool
:ivar resumed: If this connection is based on a resumed session.
:vartype allegedSrpUsername: str or None
:ivar allegedSrpUsername: This is set to the SRP username
asserted by the client, whether the handshake succeeded or not.
If the handshake fails, this can be inspected to determine
if a guessing attack is in progress against a particular user
account.
:vartype closeSocket: bool
:ivar closeSocket: If the socket should be closed when the
connection is closed, defaults to True (writable).
If you set this to True, TLS Lite will assume the responsibility of
closing the socket when the TLS Connection is shutdown (either
through an error or through the user calling close()). The default
is False.
:vartype ignoreAbruptClose: bool
:ivar ignoreAbruptClose: If an abrupt close of the socket should
raise an error (writable).
If you set this to True, TLS Lite will not raise a
:py:class:`~tlslite.errors.TLSAbruptCloseError` exception if the
underlying
socket is unexpectedly closed. Such an unexpected closure could be
caused by an attacker. However, it also occurs with some incorrect
TLS implementations.
You should set this to True only if you're not worried about an
attacker truncating the connection, and only if necessary to avoid
spurious errors. The default is False.
:vartype ~.encryptThenMAC: bool
:ivar ~.encryptThenMAC: Whether the connection uses the encrypt-then-MAC
construct for CBC cipher suites, will be False also if connection uses
RC4 or AEAD.
:vartype recordSize: int
:ivar recordSize: maximum size of data to be sent in a single record layer
message. Note that after encryption is established (generally after
handshake protocol has finished) the actual amount of data written to
network socket will be larger because of the record layer header,
padding
or encryption overhead. It can be set to low value (so that there is no
fragmentation on Ethernet, IP and TCP level) at the beginning of
connection to reduce latency and set to protocol max (2**14) to
maximise
throughput after sending the first few kiB of data. If negotiated,
record_size_limit extension may limit it though, causing reading of the
variable to return lower value that was initially set.
See also: HandshakeSettings.record_size_limit.
:vartype tickets: list of bytearray
:ivar tickets: list of session tickets received from server, oldest first.
:vartype client_cert_required: bool
:ivar client_cert_required: Set to True to make the post-handshake
authentication fail when client doesn't provide a certificate in
response
"""
[docs]
def __init__(self, sock):
sock = BufferedSocket(sock)
self.sock = sock
self._recordLayer = RecordLayer(sock)
#My session object (Session instance; read-only)
self.session = None
#Buffers for processing messages
self._defragmenter = Defragmenter()
self._defragmenter.add_static_size(ContentType.change_cipher_spec, 1)
self._defragmenter.add_static_size(ContentType.alert, 2)
self._defragmenter.add_dynamic_size(ContentType.handshake, 1, 3)
self.clearReadBuffer()
self.clearWriteBuffer()
#Handshake digests
self._handshake_hash = HandshakeHashes()
# Handshake digest used for Certificate Verify signature and
# also for EMS calculation, in practice, it excludes
# CertificateVerify and all following messages (Finished)
self._certificate_verify_handshake_hash = None
# for PSK binders we need to be able to calculate the hash of all
# echanged messages and a _truncated_ ClientHello message so we
# need a copy of those hashes before CH was received
self._pre_client_hello_handshake_hash = None
#Is the connection open?
self.closed = True #read-only
self._refCount = 0 #Used to trigger closure
#Is this a resumed session?
self.resumed = False #read-only
#What username did the client claim in his handshake?
self.allegedSrpUsername = None
#On a call to close(), do we close the socket? (writeable)
self.closeSocket = True
#If the socket is abruptly closed, do we ignore it
#and pretend the connection was shut down properly? (writeable)
self.ignoreAbruptClose = False
#Fault we will induce, for testing purposes
self.fault = None
# Temporarily limit the size of outgoing records to following size
self._user_record_limit = 16384 # 2**14
# NewSessionTickets received from server
self.tickets = []
# TLS 1.2 and earlier tickets received from server
self.tls_1_0_tickets = []
# Indicator for heartbeat extension mode, if we can receive
# heartbeat requests
self.heartbeat_can_receive = False
# Indicator for heartbeat extension mode, if we can send
# heartbeat requests
self.heartbeat_can_send = False
# Indicator, that both sides want use heartbeat extension
self.heartbeat_supported = False
# Callback function for handling responses to heartbeat requests
# we sent
self.heartbeat_response_callback = None
self._buffer_content_type = None
self._buffer = bytearray()
# tuple with list of certificates and the private key that will be
# used for post handshake authentication in TLS 1.3
self._client_keypair = None
# dictionary with CertificateRequest messages we (as a server) have
# sent, the keys are the "certificate request context" from the
# messages (which are the values)
self._cert_requests = {}
# boolean to control if PHA needs to be aborted when the client
# doesn't provide a certificate
self.client_cert_required = False
# boolean to control if ChangeCipherSpec in TLS1.3 is allowed or not
# we start with True, as peers MUST always processe the messages
# before the handshake is done, only then we disable it (for PHA)
self._middlebox_compat_mode = True
@property
def _send_record_limit(self):
"""Maximum size of payload that can be sent."""
return self._recordLayer.send_record_limit
@_send_record_limit.setter
def _send_record_limit(self, value):
"""Maximum size of payload that can be sent."""
self._recordLayer.send_record_limit = value
@property
def _recv_record_limit(self):
"""Maximum size of payload that can be received."""
return self._recordLayer.recv_record_limit
@_recv_record_limit.setter
def _recv_record_limit(self, value):
"""Maximum size of payload that can be received."""
self._recordLayer.recv_record_limit = value
@property
def recordSize(self):
"""Maximum size of the records that will be sent out."""
return min(self._user_record_limit, self._send_record_limit)
@recordSize.setter
def recordSize(self, value):
"""Size to automatically fragment records to."""
self._user_record_limit = value
@property
def _client(self):
"""Boolean stating if the endpoint acts as a client"""
return self._recordLayer.client
@_client.setter
def _client(self, value):
"""Set the endpoint to act as a client or not"""
self._recordLayer.client = value
@property
def version(self):
"""Get the SSL protocol version of connection"""
return self._recordLayer.version
@version.setter
def version(self, value):
"""
Set the SSL protocol version of connection
The setter is a public method only for backwards compatibility.
Don't use it! See at HandshakeSettings for options to set desired
protocol version.
"""
self._recordLayer.version = value
if value > (3, 3):
self._recordLayer.tls13record = True
@property
def encryptThenMAC(self):
"""Whether the connection uses Encrypt Then MAC (RFC 7366)"""
return self._recordLayer.encryptThenMAC
[docs]
def clearReadBuffer(self):
self._readBuffer = b''
[docs]
def clearWriteBuffer(self):
self._send_writer = None
#*********************************************************
# Public Functions START
#*********************************************************
[docs]
def read(self, max=None, min=1):
"""Read some data from the TLS connection.
This function will block until at least 'min' bytes are
available (or the connection is closed).
If an exception is raised, the connection will have been
automatically closed.
:type max: int
:param max: The maximum number of bytes to return.
:type min: int
:param min: The minimum number of bytes to return
:rtype: str
:returns: A string of no more than 'max' bytes, and no fewer
than 'min' (unless the connection has been closed, in which
case fewer than 'min' bytes may be returned).
:raises socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
:raises tlslite.errors.TLSAbruptCloseError: If the socket is closed
without a preceding alert.
:raises tlslite.errors.TLSAlert: If a TLS alert is signalled.
"""
for result in self.readAsync(max, min):
pass
return result
[docs]
def readAsync(self, max=None, min=1):
"""Start a read operation on the TLS connection.
This function returns a generator which behaves similarly to
read(). Successive invocations of the generator will return 0
if it is waiting to read from the socket, 1 if it is waiting
to write to the socket, or a string if the read operation has
completed.
:rtype: iterable
:returns: A generator; see above for details.
"""
constructor_type = None
if self.version > (3, 3):
allowedTypes = (ContentType.application_data,
ContentType.handshake)
if self._client_keypair:
allowedHsTypes = (HandshakeType.new_session_ticket,
HandshakeType.key_update,
HandshakeType.certificate_request)
elif self._cert_requests:
allowedHsTypes = (HandshakeType.new_session_ticket,
HandshakeType.key_update,
HandshakeType.certificate)
constructor_type = CertificateType.x509
else:
allowedHsTypes = (HandshakeType.new_session_ticket,
HandshakeType.key_update)
else:
allowedTypes = ContentType.application_data
allowedHsTypes = None
try:
try_once = True
# perform a read even if we were asked to read 0 bytes, but only
# if the buffer is empty; this is used to trigger
# processing of NST, KeyUpdate and PHA
while (len(self._readBuffer) < min or
(not self._readBuffer and try_once)) \
and not self.closed:
try_once = False
try:
for result in self._getMsg(allowedTypes,
allowedHsTypes,
constructor_type):
if result in (0, 1):
yield result
if isinstance(result, NewSessionTicket):
result.time = time.time()
self.tickets.append(result)
elif isinstance(result, KeyUpdate):
for result in self._handle_keyupdate_request(result):
yield result
# KeyUpdate messages are not solicited, while call with
# min==0 are done to perform PHA
try_once = True
elif isinstance(result, Certificate):
for result in self._handle_srv_pha(result):
yield result
elif isinstance(result, CertificateRequest):
for result in self._handle_pha(result):
yield result
else:
assert isinstance(result, ApplicationData)
applicationData = result
self._readBuffer += applicationData.write()
except TLSRemoteAlert as alert:
if alert.description != AlertDescription.close_notify:
raise
except TLSAbruptCloseError:
if not self.ignoreAbruptClose:
raise
else:
self._shutdown(True)
if max == None:
max = len(self._readBuffer)
returnBytes = self._readBuffer[:max]
self._readBuffer = self._readBuffer[max:]
yield bytes(returnBytes)
except GeneratorExit:
raise
except:
self._shutdown(False)
raise
[docs]
def unread(self, b):
"""Add bytes to the front of the socket read buffer for future
reading. Be careful using this in the context of select(...): if you
unread the last data from a socket, that won't wake up selected waiters,
and those waiters may hang forever.
"""
self._readBuffer = b + self._readBuffer
[docs]
def write(self, s):
"""Write some data to the TLS connection.
This function will block until all the data has been sent.
If an exception is raised, the connection will have been
automatically closed.
:type s: str
:param s: The data to transmit to the other party.
:raises socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
"""
for result in self.writeAsync(s):
pass
[docs]
def writeAsync(self, s):
"""Start a write operation on the TLS connection.
This function returns a generator which behaves similarly to
write(). Successive invocations of the generator will return
1 if it is waiting to write to the socket, or will raise
StopIteration if the write operation has completed.
:rtype: iterable
:returns: A generator; see above for details.
"""
try:
if self.closed:
raise TLSClosedConnectionError("attempt to write to closed connection")
applicationData = ApplicationData().create(bytearray(s))
for result in self._sendMsg(applicationData, \
randomizeFirstBlock=True):
yield result
except GeneratorExit:
raise
except Exception:
# Don't invalidate the session on write failure if abrupt closes are
# okay.
self._shutdown(self.ignoreAbruptClose)
raise
[docs]
def close(self):
"""Close the TLS connection.
This function will block until it has exchanged close_notify
alerts with the other party. After doing so, it will shut down the
TLS connection. Further attempts to read through this connection
will return "". Further attempts to write through this connection
will raise ValueError.
If makefile() has been called on this connection, the connection
will be not be closed until the connection object and all file
objects have been closed.
Even if an exception is raised, the connection will have been
closed.
:raises socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
:raises tlslite.errors.TLSAbruptCloseError: If the socket is closed
without a preceding alert.
:raises tlslite.errors.TLSAlert: If a TLS alert is signalled.
"""
if not self.closed:
for result in self._decrefAsync():
pass
# Python 3 callback
_decref_socketios = close
[docs]
def closeAsync(self):
"""Start a close operation on the TLS connection.
This function returns a generator which behaves similarly to
close(). Successive invocations of the generator will return 0
if it is waiting to read from the socket, 1 if it is waiting
to write to the socket, or will raise StopIteration if the
close operation has completed.
:rtype: iterable
:returns: A generator; see above for details.
"""
if not self.closed:
for result in self._decrefAsync():
yield result
def _decrefAsync(self):
self._refCount -= 1
if self._refCount == 0 and not self.closed:
try:
for result in self._sendMsg(Alert().create(\
AlertDescription.close_notify, AlertLevel.warning)):
yield result
alert = None
# By default close the socket, since it's been observed
# that some other libraries will not respond to the
# close_notify alert, thus leaving us hanging if we're
# expecting it
if self.closeSocket:
self._shutdown(True)
else:
while not alert:
for result in self._getMsg((ContentType.alert, \
ContentType.application_data)):
if result in (0,1):
yield result
if result.contentType == ContentType.alert:
alert = result
if alert.description == AlertDescription.close_notify:
self._shutdown(True)
else:
raise TLSRemoteAlert(alert)
except (socket.error, TLSAbruptCloseError):
#If the other side closes the socket, that's okay
self._shutdown(True)
except GeneratorExit:
raise
except:
self._shutdown(False)
raise
[docs]
def getVersionName(self):
"""Get the name of this TLS version.
:rtype: str
:returns: The name of the TLS version used with this connection.
Either None, 'SSL 3.0', 'TLS 1.0', 'TLS 1.1', 'TLS 1.2' or
'TLS 1.3'.
"""
ver = {(3, 0): "SSL 3.0",
(3, 1): "TLS 1.0",
(3, 2): "TLS 1.1",
(3, 3): "TLS 1.2",
(3, 4): "TLS 1.3"}
return ver.get(self.version)
[docs]
def getCipherName(self):
"""Get the name of the cipher used with this connection.
:rtype: str
:returns: The name of the cipher used with this connection.
Either 'aes128', 'aes256', 'rc4', or '3des'.
"""
return self._recordLayer.getCipherName()
[docs]
def getCipherImplementation(self):
"""Get the name of the cipher implementation used with
this connection.
:rtype: str
:returns: The name of the cipher implementation used with
this connection. Either 'python', 'openssl', or 'pycrypto'.
"""
return self._recordLayer.getCipherImplementation()
#Emulate a socket, somewhat -
[docs]
def send(self, s):
"""Send data to the TLS connection (socket emulation).
:raises socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
"""
self.write(s)
return len(s)
[docs]
def sendall(self, s):
"""Send data to the TLS connection (socket emulation).
:raises socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
"""
self.write(s)
[docs]
def recv(self, bufsize):
"""Get some data from the TLS connection (socket emulation).
:raises socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
:raises tlslite.errors.TLSAbruptCloseError: If the socket is closed
without a preceding alert.
:raises tlslite.errors.TLSAlert: If a TLS alert is signalled.
"""
return self.read(bufsize)
[docs]
def recv_into(self, b):
# XXX doc string
data = self.read(len(b))
if not data:
return None
b[:len(data)] = data
return len(data)
# while the SocketIO and _fileobject in socket is private we really need
# to use it as it's what the real socket does internally
# pylint: disable=no-member,protected-access
[docs]
def makefile(self, mode='r', bufsize=-1):
"""Create a file object for the TLS connection (socket emulation).
:rtype: socket._fileobject
"""
self._refCount += 1
# So, it is pretty fragile to be using Python internal objects
# like this, but it is probably the best/easiest way to provide
# matching behavior for socket emulation purposes. The 'close'
# argument is nice, its apparently a recent addition to this
# class, so that when fileobject.close() gets called, it will
# close() us, causing the refcount to be decremented (decrefAsync).
#
# If this is the last close() on the outstanding fileobjects /
# TLSConnection, then the "actual" close alerts will be sent,
# socket closed, etc.
# for writes, we MUST buffer otherwise the lengths of headers leak
# through record layer boundaries
if 'w' in mode and bufsize <= 0:
bufsize = 2**14
if sys.version_info < (3,):
return socket._fileobject(self, mode, bufsize, close=True)
else:
if 'w' in mode:
return io.BufferedWriter(socket.SocketIO(self, mode), bufsize)
else:
return socket.SocketIO(self, mode)
# pylint: enable=no-member,protected-access
[docs]
def getsockname(self):
"""Return the socket's own address (socket emulation)."""
return self.sock.getsockname()
[docs]
def getpeername(self):
"""Return the remote address to which the socket is connected
(socket emulation)."""
return self.sock.getpeername()
[docs]
def settimeout(self, value):
"""Set a timeout on blocking socket operations (socket emulation)."""
return self.sock.settimeout(value)
[docs]
def gettimeout(self):
"""Return the timeout associated with socket operations (socket
emulation)."""
return self.sock.gettimeout()
[docs]
def setsockopt(self, level, optname, value):
"""Set the value of the given socket option (socket emulation)."""
return self.sock.setsockopt(level, optname, value)
[docs]
def shutdown(self, how):
"""Shutdown the underlying socket."""
return self.sock.shutdown(how)
[docs]
def fileno(self):
"""Not implement in TLS Lite."""
raise NotImplementedError()
#*********************************************************
# Public Functions END
#*********************************************************
def _handle_pha(self, cert_request):
cert, p_key = self._client_keypair
handshake_context = self._first_handshake_hashes.copy()
handshake_context.update(cert_request.write())
prf_name = 'sha256'
prf_size = 32
if self.session.cipherSuite in CipherSuite.sha384PrfSuites:
prf_name = 'sha384'
prf_size = 48
msgs = []
msgs.append(Certificate(CertificateType.x509, self.version)
.create(cert, cert_request.certificate_request_context))
handshake_context.update(msgs[0].write())
if cert.x509List and p_key:
# sign the CertificateVerify only when we have a private key to do
# that
valid_sig_algs = cert_request.supported_signature_algs
if not valid_sig_algs:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.missing_extension,
"No signature algorithms found in CertificateRequest"):
yield result
avail_sig_algs = self._sigHashesToList(HandshakeSettings(), p_key,
cert, version=(3, 4))
sig_scheme = getFirstMatching(avail_sig_algs, valid_sig_algs)
scheme = SignatureScheme.toRepr(sig_scheme)
sig_scheme = getattr(SignatureScheme, scheme)
signature_context = \
KeyExchange.calcVerifyBytes((3, 4),
handshake_context,
sig_scheme, None, None, None,
prf_name, b'client')
if sig_scheme in (SignatureScheme.ed25519, SignatureScheme.ed448):
pad_type = None
hash_name = "intrinsic"
salt_len = None
sig_func = p_key.hashAndSign
ver_func = p_key.hashAndVerify
elif sig_scheme[1] == SignatureAlgorithm.ecdsa:
pad_type = None
hash_name = HashAlgorithm.toRepr(sig_scheme[0])
salt_len = None
sig_func = p_key.sign
ver_func = p_key.verify
else:
pad_type = SignatureScheme.getPadding(scheme)
hash_name = SignatureScheme.getHash(scheme)
salt_len = getattr(hashlib, hash_name)().digest_size
sig_func = p_key.sign
ver_func = p_key.verify
signature = sig_func(signature_context,
pad_type,
hash_name,
salt_len)
if not ver_func(signature, signature_context,
pad_type,
hash_name,
salt_len):
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.internal_error,
"Certificate Verify signature failed"):
yield result
certificate_verify = CertificateVerify(self.version)
certificate_verify.create(signature, sig_scheme)
msgs.append(certificate_verify)
handshake_context.update(certificate_verify.write())
finished_key = HKDF_expand_label(self.session.cl_app_secret,
b"finished", b"",
prf_size, prf_name)
verify_data = secureHMAC(finished_key,
handshake_context.digest(prf_name),
prf_name)
finished = Finished((3, 4), prf_size)
finished.create(verify_data)
msgs.append(finished)
for result in self._sendMsgs(msgs):
yield result
def _handle_srv_pha(self, cert):
"""Process the post-handshake authentication from client."""
prf_name = 'sha256'
prf_size = 32
if self.session.cipherSuite in CipherSuite.sha384PrfSuites:
prf_name = 'sha384'
prf_size = 48
cr_context = cert.certificate_request_context
if not cr_context:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter,
"Certificate Request context missing in Certificate "
"message from client"):
yield result
try:
cr = self._cert_requests.pop(bytes(cr_context))
except KeyError:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter,
"Certificiate Request context is incorrect or was already "
"handled previously"):
yield result
# TODO: verify that the extensions used by client were sent by us in
# CertificateReuest
handshake_context = self._first_handshake_hashes.copy()
handshake_context.update(cr.write())
handshake_context.update(cert.write())
if cert.cert_chain:
for result in self._getMsg(ContentType.handshake,
HandshakeType.certificate_verify):
if result in (0, 1):
yield result
else:
break
assert isinstance(result, CertificateVerify)
cert_verify = result
valid_sig_algs = cr.supported_signature_algs
if cert_verify.signatureAlgorithm not in valid_sig_algs:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter,
"Client selected signature algorithm we didn't "
"advertise"):
yield result
avail_sig_algs = self._sigHashesToList(HandshakeSettings(), None,
cert.cert_chain,
version=(3, 4))
if cert_verify.signatureAlgorithm not in avail_sig_algs:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter,
"Client selected signature algorithm not consistent "
"with public key in its certificate"):
yield result
scheme = SignatureScheme.toRepr(cert_verify.signatureAlgorithm)
sig_scheme = getattr(SignatureScheme, scheme)
signature_context = \
KeyExchange.calcVerifyBytes((3, 4),
handshake_context,
sig_scheme, None, None, None,
prf_name, b'client')
if sig_scheme in (SignatureScheme.ed25519, SignatureScheme.ed448):
pad_type = None
hash_name = "intrinsic"
salt_len = None
ver_func = cert.cert_chain.getEndEntityPublicKey().hashAndVerify
elif sig_scheme[1] == SignatureAlgorithm.ecdsa:
pad_type = None
hash_name = HashAlgorithm.toRepr(sig_scheme[0])
salt_len = None
ver_func = cert.cert_chain.getEndEntityPublicKey().verify
else:
pad_type = SignatureScheme.getPadding(scheme)
hash_name = SignatureScheme.getHash(scheme)
salt_len = getattr(hashlib, hash_name)().digest_size
ver_func = cert.cert_chain.getEndEntityPublicKey().verify
if not ver_func(
cert_verify.signature, signature_context, pad_type,
hash_name, salt_len):
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.decrypt_error,
"Signature verification failed"):
yield result
handshake_context.update(cert_verify.write())
elif self.client_cert_required:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.certificate_required,
"Client did not provide a certificate in post-handshake "
"authentication"):
yield result
finished_key = HKDF_expand_label(self.session.cl_app_secret,
b'finished', b'',
prf_size, prf_name)
verify_data = secureHMAC(finished_key,
handshake_context.digest(prf_name),
prf_name)
for result in self._getMsg(ContentType.handshake,
HandshakeType.finished,
prf_size):
if result in (0, 1):
yield result
else:
break
assert isinstance(result, Finished)
finished = result
if finished.verify_data != verify_data:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.decrypt_error,
"Invalid Finished verify_data from client"):
yield result
self.session.clientCertChain = cert.cert_chain
def _shutdown(self, resumable):
self._recordLayer.shutdown()
self.version = (0,0)
self.closed = True
if self.closeSocket:
self.sock.close()
#Even if resumable is False, we'll never toggle this on
if not resumable and self.session:
self.session.resumable = False
def _sendError(self, alertDescription, errorStr=None):
# make sure that the message goes out
self.sock.flush()
self.sock.buffer_writes = False
alert = Alert().create(alertDescription, AlertLevel.fatal)
for result in self._sendMsg(alert):
yield result
self._shutdown(False)
raise TLSLocalAlert(alert, errorStr)
def _sendMsgs(self, msgs):
# send messages together in a single TCP write
self.sock.buffer_writes = True
randomizeFirstBlock = True
for msg in msgs:
for result in self._sendMsg(msg, randomizeFirstBlock):
yield result
randomizeFirstBlock = True
self.sock.flush()
self.sock.buffer_writes = False
def _sendMsg(self, msg, randomizeFirstBlock=True, update_hashes=True):
"""Fragment and send message through socket"""
#Whenever we're connected and asked to send an app data message,
#we first send the first byte of the message. This prevents
#an attacker from launching a chosen-plaintext attack based on
#knowing the next IV (a la BEAST).
if randomizeFirstBlock and self.version <= (3, 1) \
and self._recordLayer.isCBCMode() \
and msg.contentType == ContentType.application_data:
msgFirstByte = msg.splitFirstByte()
for result in self._sendMsgThroughSocket(msgFirstByte):
yield result
if len(msg.write()) == 0:
return
buf = msg.write()
contentType = msg.contentType
#Update handshake hashes
if update_hashes and contentType == ContentType.handshake:
self._handshake_hash.update(buf)
#Fragment big messages
while len(buf) > self.recordSize:
newB = buf[:self.recordSize]
buf = buf[self.recordSize:]
msgFragment = Message(contentType, newB)
for result in self._sendMsgThroughSocket(msgFragment):
yield result
msgFragment = Message(contentType, buf)
for result in self._sendMsgThroughSocket(msgFragment):
yield result
def _queue_message(self, msg):
"""Just queue message for sending, for record layer coalescing."""
if self._buffer_content_type is not None and \
self._buffer_content_type != msg.contentType:
raise ValueError("Queuing of wrong message types")
if self._buffer_content_type is None:
self._buffer_content_type = msg.contentType
serialised_msg = msg.write()
self._buffer += serialised_msg
if msg.contentType == ContentType.handshake:
self._handshake_hash.update(serialised_msg)
def _queue_flush(self):
"""Send the queued messages."""
msg = Message(self._buffer_content_type, self._buffer)
for result in self._sendMsg(msg, update_hashes=False):
yield result
self._buffer_content_type = None
self._buffer = bytearray()
def _sendMsgThroughSocket(self, msg):
"""Send message, handle errors"""
try:
for result in self._recordLayer.sendRecord(msg):
if result in (0, 1):
yield result
except socket.error:
# The socket was unexpectedly closed. The tricky part
# is that there may be an alert sent by the other party
# sitting in the read buffer. So, if we get here after
# handshaking, we will just raise the error and let the
# caller read more data if it would like, thus stumbling
# upon the error.
#
# However, if we get here DURING handshaking, we take
# it upon ourselves to see if the next message is an
# Alert.
if msg.contentType == ContentType.handshake:
# See if there's an alert record
# Could raise socket.error or TLSAbruptCloseError
for result in self._getNextRecord():
if result in (0, 1):
yield result
else:
break
# Closes the socket
self._shutdown(False)
# If we got an alert, raise it
recordHeader, p = result
if recordHeader.type == ContentType.alert:
alert = Alert().parse(p)
raise TLSRemoteAlert(alert)
else:
# If we got some other message who know what
# the remote side is doing, just go ahead and
# raise the socket.error
raise
def _getMsg(self, expectedType, secondaryType=None, constructorType=None):
try:
if not isinstance(expectedType, tuple):
expectedType = (expectedType,)
#Spin in a loop, until we've got a non-empty record of a type we
#expect. The loop will be repeated if:
# - we receive a renegotiation attempt; we send no_renegotiation,
# then try again
# - we receive an empty application-data fragment; we try again
while 1:
for result in self._getNextRecord():
if result in (0,1):
yield result
else:
break
recordHeader, p = result
# if this is a CCS message in TLS 1.3, sanity check and
# continue
if self.version > (3, 3) and \
ContentType.handshake in expectedType and \
self._middlebox_compat_mode and \
recordHeader.type == ContentType.change_cipher_spec:
ccs = ChangeCipherSpec().parse(p)
if ccs.type != 1:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.unexpected_message,
"Invalid CCS message received"):
yield result
# ignore the message
continue
# TLS 1.3 Handshake messages MUST NOT be interleaved with
# other messages, Section 5.1 RFC 8446
if self.version > (3, 3) and \
recordHeader.type != ContentType.handshake and \
self._defragmenter.buffers[ContentType.handshake]:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.unexpected_message,
"Interleaved Handshake and "
"non-handshake messages"):
yield result
#If we received an unexpected record type...
if recordHeader.type not in expectedType:
#If we received an alert...
if recordHeader.type == ContentType.alert:
alert = Alert().parse(p)
#We either received a fatal error, a warning, or a
#close_notify. In any case, we're going to close the
#connection. In the latter two cases we respond with
#a close_notify, but ignore any socket errors, since
#the other side might have already closed the socket.
if alert.level == AlertLevel.warning or \
alert.description == AlertDescription.close_notify:
#If the sendMsg() call fails because the socket has
#already been closed, we will be forgiving and not
#report the error nor invalidate the "resumability"
#of the session.
try:
alertMsg = Alert()
alertMsg.create(AlertDescription.close_notify,
AlertLevel.warning)
for result in self._sendMsg(alertMsg):
yield result
except socket.error:
pass
if alert.description == \
AlertDescription.close_notify:
self._shutdown(True)
elif alert.level == AlertLevel.warning:
self._shutdown(False)
else: #Fatal alert:
self._shutdown(False)
#Raise the alert as an exception
raise TLSRemoteAlert(alert)
#If we received a renegotiation attempt...
if recordHeader.type == ContentType.handshake:
subType = p.get(1)
reneg = False
if self._client:
if subType == HandshakeType.hello_request:
reneg = True
else:
if subType == HandshakeType.client_hello:
reneg = True
# Send no_renegotiation if we're not negotiating
# a connection now, then try again
if reneg and self.session:
alertMsg = Alert()
alertMsg.create(AlertDescription.no_renegotiation,
AlertLevel.warning)
for result in self._sendMsg(alertMsg):
yield result
continue
# If we received a heartbeat request and heartbeat
# extension was negotiated
if recordHeader.type == ContentType.heartbeat and \
self.heartbeat_supported:
try:
heartbeat_message = Heartbeat().parse(p)
# If we received heartbeat request, then we
# response with response create from request
if heartbeat_message.message_type == \
HeartbeatMessageType.heartbeat_request:
if not self.heartbeat_can_receive:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.
unexpected_message,
"Received heartbeat_request to "
"peer_not_allowed_to_send mode"):
yield result
if len(heartbeat_message.padding) < 16:
# per RFC, silently ignore if the message
# is malformed
continue
heartbeat_response = heartbeat_message.\
create_response()
for result in self._sendMsg(
heartbeat_response):
yield result
# If we received heartbeat response, then we
# check, if its payload is same as payload of
# request we sent
elif heartbeat_message.message_type == \
HeartbeatMessageType.heartbeat_response \
and self.heartbeat_response_callback:
self.heartbeat_response_callback(
heartbeat_message)
except (socket.error, SyntaxError):
pass
continue
#Otherwise: this is an unexpected record, but neither an
#alert nor renegotiation
for result in self._sendError(\
AlertDescription.unexpected_message,
"received type=%d" % recordHeader.type):
yield result
#If this is an empty application-data fragment, try again
if recordHeader.type == ContentType.application_data:
if p.index == len(p.bytes):
continue
break
#Parse based on content_type
if recordHeader.type == ContentType.change_cipher_spec:
yield ChangeCipherSpec().parse(p)
elif recordHeader.type == ContentType.alert:
yield Alert().parse(p)
elif recordHeader.type == ContentType.application_data:
yield ApplicationData().parse(p)
elif recordHeader.type == ContentType.handshake:
#Convert secondaryType to tuple, if it isn't already
if not isinstance(secondaryType, tuple):
secondaryType = (secondaryType,)
#If it's a handshake message, check handshake header
if recordHeader.ssl2:
subType = p.get(1)
if subType != HandshakeType.client_hello:
for result in self._sendError(\
AlertDescription.unexpected_message,
"Can only handle SSLv2 ClientHello messages"):
yield result
if HandshakeType.client_hello not in secondaryType:
for result in self._sendError(\
AlertDescription.unexpected_message):
yield result
subType = HandshakeType.client_hello
else:
subType = p.get(1)
if subType not in secondaryType:
exp = to_str_delimiter(HandshakeType.toStr(i) for i in
secondaryType)
rec = HandshakeType.toStr(subType)
for result in self._sendError(AlertDescription
.unexpected_message,
"Expecting {0}, got {1}"
.format(exp, rec)):
yield result
# in TLS 1.3 some Handshake messages MUST NOT span key changes
if self.version > (3, 3) and \
subType in (HandshakeType.client_hello,
HandshakeType.end_of_early_data,
HandshakeType.server_hello,
HandshakeType.finished,
HandshakeType.key_update) and \
not self._defragmenter.is_empty():
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.unexpected_message,
"CH, EOED, SH, Finished, or KU not aligned with "
"record boundary"):
yield result
#Update handshake hashes
self._handshake_hash.update(p.bytes)
#Parse based on handshake type
if subType == HandshakeType.client_hello:
yield ClientHello(recordHeader.ssl2).parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.server_hello:
yield ServerHello().parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.certificate:
yield Certificate(constructorType, self.version).parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.certificate_request:
yield CertificateRequest(self.version).parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.certificate_verify:
yield CertificateVerify(self.version).parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.server_key_exchange:
yield ServerKeyExchange(constructorType,
self.version).parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.server_hello_done:
yield ServerHelloDone().parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.client_key_exchange:
yield ClientKeyExchange(constructorType, \
self.version).parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.finished:
yield Finished(self.version, constructorType).parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.next_protocol:
yield NextProtocol().parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.encrypted_extensions:
yield EncryptedExtensions().parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.new_session_ticket:
if self.version < (3, 4):
yield NewSessionTicket1_0().parse(p)
else:
yield NewSessionTicket().parse(p)
elif subType == HandshakeType.key_update:
yield KeyUpdate().parse(p)
else:
raise AssertionError()
#If an exception was raised by a Parser or Message instance:
except BadCertificateError as e:
for result in self._sendError(AlertDescription.bad_certificate,
formatExceptionTrace(e)):
yield result
except SyntaxError as e:
for result in self._sendError(AlertDescription.decode_error,
formatExceptionTrace(e)):
yield result
#Returns next record or next handshake message
def _getNextRecord(self):
"""read next message from socket, defragment message"""
while True:
# support for fragmentation
# (RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1)
# Because the Record Layer is completely separate from the messages
# that traverse it, it should handle both application data and
# hadshake data in the same way. For that we buffer the handshake
# messages until they are completely read.
# This makes it possible to handle both handshake data not aligned
# to record boundary as well as handshakes longer than single
# record.
while True:
# empty message buffer
ret = self._defragmenter.get_message()
if ret is None:
break
header = RecordHeader3().create(self.version, ret[0], 0)
yield header, Parser(ret[1])
# CCS can be sent before early_data but processing it will
# remove the flag from record layer, so reset it
early_data_ok = self._recordLayer.early_data_ok
# when the message buffer is empty, read next record from socket
for result in self._getNextRecordFromSocket():
if result in (0, 1):
yield result
else:
break
header, parser = result
# application data (and CCS in TLS1.3) isn't made out of messages,
# pass it through
if header.type == ContentType.application_data or \
(self.version > (3, 3) and
header.type == ContentType.change_cipher_spec):
# CCS doesn't change the status of undecryptable
# records
if header.type == ContentType.change_cipher_spec:
self._recordLayer.early_data_ok = early_data_ok
yield (header, parser)
# heartbeat message isn't made out of messages, too
elif header.type == ContentType.heartbeat:
yield (header, parser)
# If it's an SSLv2 ClientHello, we can return it as well, since
# it's the only ssl2 type we support
elif header.ssl2:
yield (header, parser)
else:
# other types need to be put into buffers
self._defragmenter.add_data(header.type, parser.bytes)
def _getNextRecordFromSocket(self):
"""Read a record, handle errors"""
try:
# otherwise... read the next record
for result in self._recordLayer.recvRecord():
if result in (0, 1):
yield result
else:
break
except TLSUnexpectedMessage:
for result in self._sendError(AlertDescription.unexpected_message):
yield result
except TLSRecordOverflow:
for result in self._sendError(AlertDescription.record_overflow):
yield result
except TLSIllegalParameterException:
for result in self._sendError(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter):
yield result
except TLSDecryptionFailed:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.decryption_failed,
"Encrypted data not a multiple of blocksize"):
yield result
except TLSBadRecordMAC:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.bad_record_mac,
"MAC failure (or padding failure)"):
yield result
header, parser = result
# RFC5246 section 6.2.1: Implementations MUST NOT send
# zero-length fragments of content types other than Application
# Data.
if header.type != ContentType.application_data \
and parser.getRemainingLength() == 0:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.unexpected_message,
"Received empty non-application data record"):
yield result
if header.type not in ContentType.all:
for result in self._sendError(\
AlertDescription.unexpected_message, \
"Received record with unknown ContentType"):
yield result
yield (header, parser)
def _handshakeStart(self, client):
if not self.closed:
raise ValueError("Renegotiation disallowed for security reasons")
self._client = client
self._handshake_hash = HandshakeHashes()
self._certificate_verify_handshake_hash = None
self._pre_client_hello_handshake_hash = None
self._defragmenter.clear_buffers()
self.allegedSrpUsername = None
self._refCount = 1
def _handshakeDone(self, resumed):
self.resumed = resumed
self.closed = False
def _calcPendingStates(self, cipherSuite, masterSecret,
clientRandom, serverRandom, implementations):
self._recordLayer.calcPendingStates(cipherSuite, masterSecret,
clientRandom, serverRandom,
implementations)
def _changeWriteState(self):
self._recordLayer.changeWriteState()
def _changeReadState(self):
self._recordLayer.changeReadState()
[docs]
def write_heartbeat(self, payload, padding_length):
"""Start a write operation of heartbeat_request.
:type payload: bytes
:param payload: Payload, that we want send in request and
get at response.
:type padding_length: int
:param padding_length: Length of padding.
:raise socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
"""
if self.closed:
raise TLSClosedConnectionError(
"attempt to write to closed connection")
if not self.heartbeat_supported or not self.heartbeat_can_send:
raise TLSInternalError("attempt to send Heartbeat request when "
"we cant send it to other side")
heartbeat_request = Heartbeat().create(
HeartbeatMessageType.heartbeat_request, payload, padding_length)
for result in self._sendMsg(heartbeat_request,
randomizeFirstBlock=False):
yield result
[docs]
def send_heartbeat_request(self, payload, padding_length):
"""Synchronous version of write_heartbeat function.
:type payload: bytes
:param payload: Payload, that we want send in request and
get at response.
:type padding_length: int
:param padding_length: Length of padding.
:raise socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
"""
for _ in self.write_heartbeat(payload, padding_length):
pass
def _handle_keyupdate_request(self, request):
"""Process the KeyUpdate request.
:type request: KeyUpdate
:param request: Recieved KeyUpdate message.
"""
if request.message_type == KeyUpdateMessageType.update_not_requested or\
request.message_type == KeyUpdateMessageType.update_requested:
self.session.cl_app_secret, self.session.sr_app_secret = self._recordLayer.\
calcTLS1_3KeyUpdate_sender(
self.session.cipherSuite,
self.session.cl_app_secret,
self.session.sr_app_secret)
if request.message_type == KeyUpdateMessageType.update_requested:
for result in self.send_keyupdate_request(
KeyUpdateMessageType.update_not_requested):
yield result
else:
for result in self._sendError(
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter,
"Received KeyUpdate request with unknown message_type"):
yield result
[docs]
def send_keyupdate_request(self, message_type):
"""Send a KeyUpdate message.
:type payload: int
:param payload: Type of KeyUpdate message.
:raise socket.error: If a socket error occurs.
"""
if self.closed:
raise TLSClosedConnectionError(
"attempt to write to closed connection")
if self.version != (3, 4):
raise TLSIllegalParameterException("KeyUpdate is a TLS 1.3 specific"
" feature")
keyupdate_request = KeyUpdate().create(message_type)
for result in self._sendMsg(keyupdate_request):
yield result
self.session.cl_app_secret, self.session.sr_app_secret = \
self._recordLayer.calcTLS1_3KeyUpdate_reciever(
self.session.cipherSuite,
self.session.cl_app_secret,
self.session.sr_app_secret)